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Abstract. Vazquez (2014) proposes to rank opportunity sets on the
basis of the similarities of the elements within each set. The ranking rule,
denoted by SL, is lexicographic and takes into account the indirect utility,
the number of elements that are similar to the best element, and nally
1
the utilities of representatives of subsequently lower similarity classes.
This note corrects a gap in the characterization of this rule.
We recall the setup, argue that the rule SL violates one of the axioms, propose a
modied version of this axiom, and restore the characterization result.
The set X of alternatives is equipped with an asymmetric preference relation P . A
non-empty subset of X is called an opportunity set, Z collects all opportunity sets,
and % is an ordering on Z. A similarity relation S on X induces a partitioning of
the opportunity sets into homogeneous partition classes. As such, the opportunity
set A partitions into
A = A1 [ A2 [    [ Ak;
with A1PA2P   PAk. Elements in the same partition class are suciently close (in
terms of preferences). The best element of the homogeneous class Ai is denoted by
ai.
Axiom (S-C) introduces a three-clause similarity-composition condition. (S-C,a)
considers four homogeneous opportunity sets A;B;C;D with A \ C = B \D = ?,
A  B, APc1, BPd1, and a1Sd1; and imposes that B [D % A [ C. This axiom is
used in the proof of Lemma 1 and of Theorem 1 (case 3).
We now argue that the rule SL does not satisfy (S-C,a). Split up a large homogeneous
set into two disjoint parts A andD with APD and jDj  2. Let B = A and C = fd1g.
Then, c1 = d1, APc1, and a1Sd1. According to (S-C,a), B [ D % A [ C. The sets
A[C and B [D are both homogeneous and have the same indirect utility (equal to
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u(a1)). According to SL, the smaller set A[C is strictly better than B[D = A[D
(cf. Lemma 2). Conclude that SL violates (S-C,a).
The following modied version (S-C,a) of (S-C,a) restores the characterization re-
sult.
(S-C,a). Let A;B;C;D be homogeneous, D = fd1g, A \ C = B \D = ?, APc1,
BPd1, A  B, and a1Sd1. Then, B [D % A [ C.
The rule SL satises axiom (C-S,a). We now reconsider the proofs of Lemma 1 and
Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. Both (S-C,a) and (S-C,a) turn the indierence fa1g  fb1g into
fa1; 2g  fb1; 2g. No further changes are needed: continue the proof and con-
clude that homogeneous sets with the same indirect utility and the same cardinality
are equally good.
Theorem 1 (case 3). Here, (S-C,a) is used to obtain that B1 [ fb2g % B. In this
case, however, the use of (S-C,a) can be avoided. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. B = B1 [ fb2g. Then, B1 [ fb2g  B.
Case 2. B is a strict superset of B1 [ fb2g. Now, let z 6= b2 be the worst (in
term of preferences) element in B and let B0 = B n fzg. Then, B01 = B1. Lemma
3 entails B1  B0. Use (S-C,c) with B1 (homogeneous), B0 (not homogeneous),
B1  B0, C = fb2g (homogeneous and B1PC), and D = fzg (homogeneous and
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B0Pz). Conclude that B1 [ fb2g  B0 [ fzg.
Hence, in both cases, the desired conclusion B1 [ fb2g % B is obtained.
Independency (page 26, rst column, bottom, item 1). The lexicographic ordering
on Z satises (M). Indeed, for each pair a1 and a2 such that a1Pa2, the vector
(u(a1); 2) dominates (u(a1); u(a2)) (as all utilities belong to the [0; 1]-interval). Hence,
this rule does not entail that (M) is independent of the other axioms.
Here, we propose to consider the set X = fx; yg with xPy. The ordering %, dened
by fxg  fx; yg  fyg, violates (M) and satises the other three axioms. Alternati-
vely, one can change the value 2 (used to expand the vector of utilities) into 0 and
use the lexicographic ordering.
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